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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3569 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  DR. LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
(Related to D. Del. Civ. Nos. 1-12-cv-00355, 1-13-cv-01812, 
1-14-cv-00091, 1-14-cv-00373 & 1-14-cv-00495) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard J. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
December 10, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion and Order filed: January 28, 2016) 
 
Lakshmi Arunachalam 
222 Stanford Avenue 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
 
  Petitioner Pro Se 
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Joseph M. Beauchamp, Esq. 
Jones Day 
717 Texas, Suite 3300 
Houston, TX 77002 
 
Tharan G. Lanier, Esq. 
Jones Day 
1755 Embaracdero Road 
East Palo Alto, CA 94303 
 
          Counsel for Respondent, Citizens Financial Group, Inc. 
 
 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam has filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus seeking an order requiring the 
disqualification of a District Judge.  We conclude that we lack 
jurisdiction over the petition and will direct the Clerk to 
transfer it to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. 
 Arunachalam is a plaintiff in a number of related 
patent infringement actions that are or were pending in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  Her 
complaints invoke the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 
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U.S.C. § 1338(a) and are premised solely on alleged patent 
infringement.  Thus, any appeal from the final decisions in 
these actions must be taken to the Federal Circuit, which has 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent infringement 
actions.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); Christianson v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988).  
Indeed, Arunachalam already has taken one such appeal to 
the Federal Circuit, which dismissed it as a sanction 
following briefing.  See Pi-Net Int’l, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase 
& Co., 600 F. App’x 774, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
No. 15-691 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2016).1 
 In the actions at issue here, Arunachalam filed motions 
to disqualify the District Judge on the basis of the District 
Judge’s ownership of mutual funds that have holdings in 
certain of the defendant corporations.  The District Judge 
denied the motions by issuing the same memorandum and 
order in each action on March 28, 2015.  Arunachalam now 
challenges that ruling by seeking a writ of mandamus from 
this Court ordering the District Judge’s disqualification.   
 A District Judge’s denial of a disqualification is 
properly reviewable by mandamus, at least when 
disqualification is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 455.  See In re 
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 & n.7 (3d Cir. 
2003); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776-77 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Our authority to issue writs of mandamus, 
                                              
1 The District Court actions presently at issue are D. Del. Civ. 
Nos. 1-12-cv-00355, 1-13-cv-01812, 1-14-cv-00091, and 1-
14-cv-00373.  Arunachalam notes that she is not seeking 
relief in D. Del. Civ. No. 1-14-cv-00495 because that action 
has been dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the 
parties. 
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however, extends only to situations in which doing so would 
be “in aid of” our jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).  “Before 
entertaining [an] application [for mandamus], then, we must 
identify a jurisdiction that the issuance of the writ might 
assist.”  United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 
1981).  As explained above, the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
jurisdiction over any appeals that might be taken from the 
final decisions in these actions.  Thus, it does not appear that 
the actions “may at some future time come within th[is] 
court’s appellate jurisdiction.”  Id.  Because we lack appellate 
jurisdiction over these actions, we have no jurisdiction that 
issuance of the writ can be said to assist. 
 For this reason, the only Courts of Appeals to have 
addressed the issue have concluded that they lack jurisdiction 
to issue writs of mandamus in patent infringement actions 
over which the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction.  See Lights of Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 130 
F.3d 1369, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); In re BBC 
Int’l, Ltd., 99 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 1996).  Those courts 
concluded that, when the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
mandamus jurisdiction as well.  See Lights of Am., 130 F.3d 
at 1371; In re BBC Int’l, Ltd., 99 F.3d at 813.  The Federal 
Circuit agrees that it has exclusive mandamus jurisdiction in 
patent infringement actions, see In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 
1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and it regularly exercises that 
jurisdiction to entertain disqualification-based mandamus 
petitions like the one that Arunachalam filed here, see, e.g., In 
re Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 166 F. App’x 490, 491-92 
(Fed. Cir. 2006).  Decisions by other courts in analogous 
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contexts are in accord.2  We agree with these decisions and 
conclude that, when the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over a patent infringement action, it has 
exclusive jurisdiction over mandamus petitions arising from 
that action as well.   
 Arunachalam argues that we have jurisdiction over her 
petition pursuant to the residual jurisdictional statute, which 
provides in relevant part that, “[e]xcept as provided in 
section[] . . . 1295 of this title, appeals from reviewable 
decisions of the district . . . courts shall be taken . . . to the 
court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district[.]”  28 
U.S.C. § 1294(1).  She further argues that our jurisdiction 
under this statute is established by Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 247 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 
2001).   
                                              
2 See, e.g., In re Russell, 155 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(dismissing mandamus petition addressed to the United States 
Court of Veterans Appeals because that court is under the 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit); In re 
McBryde, 117 F.3d 208, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) does not authorize the court “to issue a 
preemptory writ regarding a case over which it would never 
have appellate jurisdiction”); In re Rios, 863 F.2d 202, 204 
(2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that “a court of appeals 
may issue mandamus to a district court located beyond the 
scope of its appellate jurisdiction”); In re Stone, 569 F.2d 
156, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that court 
lacked jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus to the Tax 
Court when an appeal therefrom would go to a different 
circuit). 
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 Arunachalam’s reliance on these authorities is 
misplaced.  In the first place, the residual jurisdictional statute 
applies by its terms only to “appeals,” and a mandamus 
proceeding is not an “appeal.”  See Madden v. Myers, 102 
F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996).  We could construe 
Arunachalam’s mandamus petition as a notice of appeal if 
appropriate, but there is no reason to do so because construing 
it as a notice of appeal would merely subject it to dismissal 
for other reasons as noted in the margin.3 
 Medtronic AVE is inapposite as well.  In that case, we 
concluded that we had appellate jurisdiction to review an 
interlocutory but immediately appealable order denying a stay 
of a patent infringement action pending arbitration.  See 
Medtronic AVE, 247 F.3d at 52-53.  We acknowledged that, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), the Federal Circuit would have 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over any appeal from the final 
decision in that patent infringement action.  See id. at 51-52.  
We reasoned, however, that the Federal Circuit’s appellate 
jurisdiction under § 1295(a) extends only to “final decisions” 
and that the order denying a stay pending arbitration was not 
a “final decision.”  Id. at 52.  Thus, we concluded that the 
Federal Circuit did not have appellate jurisdiction over that 
                                              
3 A District Judge’s denial of a motion for disqualification, 
though sometimes reviewable by mandamus, is not an 
immediately appealable order.  See In re Kensington Int’l 
Ltd., 353 F.3d at 219 n.7; In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 
at 776.  Arunachalam’s mandamus petition also would be 
untimely if construed as a notice of appeal because the 
District Court denied reconsideration of its disqualification 
ruling on April 1, 2015, and Arunachalam filed her petition 
on October 23, 2015.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
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order and that we had such jurisdiction pursuant to the 
residual jurisdictional statute.  See id. at 52-53.  In doing so, 
we distinguished the decision in the mandamus context in In 
re BBC International cited above.  As we explained, “our 
methodology [in the appellate context] is different as we are 
deciding the case on the basis of what court has jurisdiction 
now.  Thus, our analysis in no way is confined by a provision 
such as that in section 1651(a) that a court may issue writs ‘in 
aid’ of its jurisdiction.”  Id. at 53. 
 In the mandamus context, by contrast, our analysis is 
indeed confined by that very provision.  Because we may 
issue writs of mandamus only “in aid of” our jurisdiction, and 
because we will not possess appellate jurisdiction over the 
final orders in these patent infringement actions, we do not 
have jurisdiction over Arunachalam’s mandamus petition.  
Such jurisdiction lies exclusively with the Federal Circuit. 
 For these reasons, it is hereby O R D E R E D that the 
Clerk transfer the mandamus petition to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1631.  We express no opinion on the merits of the petition.  
Our disposition terminates this proceeding in this Court. 
